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Is Cultural-Historical Activity
Theory Threatened to Fall
Short of its Own Principles
and Possibilities as a
Dialectical Social Science?
to change today, in which direction will CHAT
be heading? Will it continue to be one of those
projects “unique for its practical, political,
and civic engagement” committed “to ideals
of social justice, equality, and social change”
as it was in the beginning (Stetsenko & Ari-
evitch, 2004, p. 58)? Although a positive fu-
ture of CHAT seems to lie ahead, we consider
in this article some of the problematics that
may challenge all those who want to pass the
“impressive dimensions of theorizing” from
“insider” circles to a larger audience and from
one generation to another as well as encourage
newcomers to become part of this tradition
through critical engagement in its theory and
practice. A key to these engagements, we sug-
gest, is not only the comprehensive empirical
and philosophical basis, but also the role of
dialectics as both topic and method. There-
fore, the challenge for newcomers (as well as
for “old-timers”) to take on the tradition of
CHAT is not a small one indeed. We assume
that a major reason for the increasing inter-
est in CHAT lies in its potential to provide a
non-reductionist approach to human develop-
ment, which is due to its affinity to dialectics;
Introduction1
In recent years, many researchers engaged
in diverse areas and approaches of “cultural-
historical activity theory” (CHAT)2 realized
an increasing international interest in Lev S.
Vygotsky’s, A. N. Leont’ev’s, and A. Luria’s
work and its continuations. Not so long ago,
Yrjö Engeström (1993) noted that the activity
approach was still “the best-held secret of aca-
demia” (p. 64) and highlighted the “impressive
dimension of theorizing behind” it. Certainly,
this remark reflects a time when CHAT was off
the beaten tracks. But if this situation begins
 1 The major part of this article is written by Ines Lange-
meyer. Wolff-Michael Roth contributed mainly to the
outline of dialectics in Hegel’s philosophy.
 2 This term (and its abbreviation) has emerged a few
years ago and tries to address simultaneously Vy-
gotsky’s “cultural-historical school” and Leont’ev’s
“activity theory” to emphasize the continuous elabo-
ration of the theoretical basis. However, the thesis of
a continuous development is still contested and also
today approaches within this tradition have not been
unified. In this article, we will refer to this neologism
to name the diversity of approaches that relate to the
work of Vygotsky and his collaborators. We will also
use this abbreviation here, but more for convenience
and without any allusion.
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however, the close interrelation to a tradition
that reaches back to the theories of Georg W.F.
Hegel and Karl Marx, among others, is not the
easiest to master.
In consideration of these difficulties, the
purpose of this article is to investigate how
contemporary approaches within CHAT can
continue to provide a dialectical framework to
preserve and renew the critical intention of this
tradition, and how we run the risk of losing
this sting. Thereby, we sensitize researchers to
the problem of developing a cultural-histori-
cal approach within a historical situation that
confronts us with new, unanswered questions.
In this light, we also problematize the use of
scientific language, for it may lead us to speak
and argue un-dialectically when in fact we in-
tend or ought to think dialectically.
This article seeks to convey insights and
arguments of how we can relate our theoretical
approaches to a tradition of dialectical think-
ing and in what ways this is paramount for a
critical engagement in theory and practice. In
the first part, we therefore discuss not only
some major theorems in Hegel’s and Marx’s
work but also, and above all, Vygotsky’s way
of developing the cultural-historical approach
of psychology. Second, we argue that the con-
temporary, widely known version of CHAT,
related to Yrjö Engeström’s theoretical and
empirical work, neglects different aspects
of dialectical thinking and consequently nar-
rows its potential to a socio-critical approach
to societal practice and human development.
A crucial question of this scrutiny will be the
notion of contradictions and how develop-
ment is supposed to be achieved. In general,
our intention is not only to clarify the role of
dialectics as a method for activity theory but
also to problematize the role of the subjects of
research in CHAT and to confront ourselves
with the problems of practicing and develop-
ing a critical science in face of a complex and
challenging societal world.
What are Perspectives of
Dialectical Thinking? What
are Dialectical Concepts?
To realize the capacity of the dialectical ap-
proach, we first articulate how dialectical
concepts were developed and how dialectical
thinking proceeds. This philosophical back-
ground helps to understand CHAT’s con-
ceptual roots and highlight its potential for
critical research. We begin by acknowledging
that we cannot deny, as Wolfgang Fritz Haug
argues, a fundamental problem of dialectical
thinking is already inherent in each attempt
to grasp the nature of dialectics: “It appears
almost impossible to speak about dialectics
without speaking un-dialectically, and thus,
as the dialectician Brecht warned, to transform
‘the flux of the things itself into a static thing’
(6.1.48, Arbeitsjournal, Brecht 1993, 384)”
(Haug, 1996/2005, p. 241).
In what follows, we do not claim (nor intend)
to do justice to the entire history of dialectics.
We merely seek to highlight in an exemplary
way how and why dialectics are important
in Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophies and why
this has nurtured critical ways of theorizing.
This provides a sufficient basis to explain how
dialectical thinking has been at work in the
development of Vygotsky’s thought. Finally,
after dealing with these sources of dialectical
thinking, we summarize what characterizes
different perspectives inherent in them in order
to develop a more general idea of dialectics.3
Dialectics as a (Self-)Critical
Way of Thinking
The first insight we can extract from Hegel is
to grasp how and why he rejects a philosophi-
cal distinction of subject and object as separate
 3 For readers who want to get a better orientation in
view of this difficult matter, we suggest to begin with
this section summary and then return to the following
subchapters.
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entities in favor of the idea that both, in the
realm of consciousness, mutually constitute
each other. To this day, this radically ques-
tions those theories that take the independent
existence of the subject of an epistemological
or practical activity4 and its object for granted,
as stable “elements,” without any interest in
their interrelations, their histories, and their
changes in different contexts.
We begin with Hegel’s reformulation of
the problem of knowledge (of what we can
know for sure or hold true) as a problem of
the self: in so doing, he described a movement
of thinking (consciousness) that stands for a
powerful notion of dialectics in relation to
German Idealism. To theorize this movement,
Hegel starts with an undifferentiated subject
of consciousness (“Geist,” translated by some
as “Spirit” by others as “Mind”). Conscious-
ness, he argues, cannot remain subjective and
as such identical with itself, because the notion
implies an object of consciousness, for con-
sciousness always is consciousness of some-
thing. This object of consciousness is other
than the subject of consciousness, in fact, is
the negation of the subject and thus unfolds a
specific movement: “Spirit becomes object be-
cause it is just this movement of becoming an
other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself,
and of suspending this otherness” (Hegel,
1807/1977, p. 21 [§36]). This becoming other
to itself, negating and thereby alienating itself,
allows consciousness to evolve when it “re-
turns to itself from this alienation,” because
 4 In this sentence, the word “subject” indicates an indi-
vidual or a group of people who act(s) intentionally on
something in a certain way; by “object” we address that
thing which is transformed by that action. Thus, we al-
ready interpret the subject-object-relation as a theorem
that stands for the societal relation mediating between
real human beings and their real social and natural
environment. But in what follows on Hegel’s philoso-
phy, subject and object are merely poles or extremes
within each movement of thinking. This difference is
important to acknowledge before tranferring Hegel’s
dialectics to “real” phenomena.
it is “only then revealed for the first time in
its actuality and truth” (p. 21 [§36]). Conse-
quently, everything we know is a product of
this movement of thinking (thought). This can
be critically reflected upon only by making the
movement available to another movement of
thinking. Yet, the philosopher admits that “it is
far harder to bring fixed thoughts into a fluid
state than to do so with sensuous existence”
(Hegel, 1977, p. 20 [§33]).
Connected to this problem is the question
where this movement of thinking comes from
and how it relates to our reality, which we seek
to comprehend. Hegel’s solution will become
clearer as we explain the inner contradiction
between subject and object. It may not satisfy
us, however.
As mentioned, Hegel argues that subject
and object are not independent entities but that
they form a new unit. This new unit sublates
(“hebt auf”)—i.e., overcomes, includes, tran-
scends, and destructs—the opposition between
the two, which is articulated (following Jo-
hann G. Fichte and Friedrich W.J. Schelling)
as activity. This activity stands for the idea
that subject and object are mutually presup-
posing and constitutive opposites that cannot
be thought independently and therefore are
complementary but irreducible expressions
of the same unit. But it is paramount that the
unit does not result from a collation of the
two—”since object and subject, etc. signify
what they are outside of their unity” (p. 23
[§39])—but rather, it sublates their difference.
Hegel terms it “an inner difference”—a differ-
ence of the thing with itself, which leads to
inner contradictions of the unit. Thus, contra-
dictions are included into the very nature of
thought (cf. Tolman, 2001).
Such an inner contradiction now provides
Hegel with a “mechanism” for movement
which explains why contradictions can in fact
make a unit: “The movement of a being that
immediately is, consists partly in becoming an
other than itself, and thus becoming its own
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immanent content; partly in taking back into
itself this unfolding or this existence of it, i.e.
in making itself into a moment, and simplify-
ing itself into something determinate” (Hegel,
1977, p. 32 [§53]). This self-movement—
brought about by the inner difference—gives
rise to self-differentiation, because conscious-
ness, having turned a part of itself into the
object, discovers contradictions. Conscious-
ness resolves these contradictions by means of
a process of sublation (“Aufhebung”), which
both deconstructs and overcomes a contradic-
tion in articulating new units of which the old
contradictions are but moments and external
expressions. Here, the term moment means that
the units are identifiable structures in the new
unit, but structures that cannot be thought in-
dependently from each other—they therefore
are not elements. The movement, as Hegel as-
sumed, could be observed not only in scientific
thought but also in “common understanding
[which], too, is a becoming, and, as this be-
coming, it is reasonableness” (p. 34 [§55]).
This strong belief in an epistemological as well
as societal process in which reason constantly
progresses essentially characterizes Hegel’s
philosophy as he conveys that not only a con-
clusion (“Schluss,” translated with regard to
the philosophy of logic as “syllogism”) would
be rational, but everything rational would be 
a conclusion (cf. Science of Logic, Doctrine 
of the Notion, Subjectivity, ch. 3, §1437).
Hegel’s insights to the movement of think-
ing may lead us to a dialectical praxis of theo-
rizing that challenges researchers not to con-
geal the object in their thoughts by identifying
it with a single concept or by “fitting it into”
a predetermined category, but “to allow the
phenomenon to speak as such” (Adorno, 2005,
Aph. 46). It is important to mention two major
counter-arguments against Hegel’s understand-
ing of dialectics. First, the assumption of a
historical progress by which society would
become increasingly rational and reasonable
has been criticized as a hope of Enlightenment
that has to be rethought especially in view of
the appalling dialectics of “instrumental rea-
son” in the 20th century.5 Second, it has often
been argued against Hegel that the bridge to
overcome the difference between reality and
thinking still remained wishful thinking. Let
us therefore take a look at Marx’s understand-
ing and use of dialectics that also has been
one important background for the mentioned
counter-arguments against Hegel.
Marx acknowledges Hegel’s method and his
idea to comprehend “every form in the flux of
movement” (MECW 35, p. 20). However, he
also develops a fundamental critique of it and
rejects it for its “mystified form” (MECW 43,
p. 31; cf. MECW 42, p. 544 and 40, p. 249).
For Marx, the problem is that “Hegel fell into
the illusion of conceiving the real as the pro-
duct of thought concentrating itself, probing its
own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself,
by itself” (Marx, 1973, p. 101) and that
“empirical actuality is admitted just as it is and is
also said to be rational; but not rational because of
its own reason, but because the empirical fact in
its empirical existence has a significance which is
other than it itself. The fact, which is the starting
point, is not conceived to be such but rather to be
the mystical result. The actual becomes phenom-
enon, but the Idea has no other content than this
phenomenon. Moreover, the idea has no other than
the logical aim, namely, ‘to become explicit as infi-
nite actual mind’.” (Marx, MECW 3, part 1)
Marx warns us not to overestimate the power
of Hegel’s method, because in so doing, dia-
lectics could be misinterpreted as a univer-
sal law (as Engels did later, for example, cf.
MECW 24, p. 301). In contrast to this, Marx
seeks to transfer and employ it in a “critical
and revolutionary” way (MECW 35, p. 20).
 5 Cf. Horkheimer/Adorno (1947/2002): Dialectics of 
Enlightenment; cf. Adorno (1955/2005): “Dialectical
reason [Vernunft: reason] is, against the ruling one,
unreason [Unvernunft]: only by carrying over and sub-
lating the latter, does it become rational [vernünftig:
reasonable, rational]” (Aph. 55).
Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth
24
We clarify how this contributed to a self-criti-
cal way of thinking in this next step of our
brief outline of dialectical thinking.
An important dimension of Marx’s criti-
cal use of dialectics can be traced to his First
Thesis on Feuerbach. Here, Marx develops
one of his three major critiques (Haug, 2001),6
the critique of the “form of the object” within
the non-dialectical and a-historical epistemic
activity (“Erkenntnistätigkeit”):
The chief defect of all hitherto existing mate-
rialism (including that of Feuerbach) is that the
object [“Gegenstand”], reality, sensuousness, is
taken only in the form of the object ["Objekt"] 
or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human 
activity, praxis, not subjectively. Hence, in contra-
distinction to materialism, idealism developed its
active aspect, but only in abstract form, because,
of course, it does not know real, sensuous activity
as such. (Marx, 1969, p. 533)
As Haug (2001, pp. 92-94) explains, this cri-
tique makes a simple but revolutionary turn
by posing the question of how reality comes
into the form of the object. Like Hegel, Marx
presupposes here the complementary unity of
subject and object, but instead of searching for
their progressive mutual relationship in a ratio-
nal historical process that is allegedly reflected
in the movement of thinking, he acknowledges
the difference between the epistemic and the
real object and detects an ideological effect of
any purely epistemic activity relating subject
and object: Within this movement of thinking,
Marx conveys, reality would no longer appear
in the form of objects of practice. It remains
passive contemplation that disregards sensuous
 6 Haug (2001, pp. 92-93) argues that three critiques are
developed in Marx’s work beginning with the critique
of the form of the object, which we explain here; sec-
ond the theory of ideology, which goes far beyond the
critique of false consciousness for it investigates ideol-
ogy as a function of domination and regulation; and
third, the analysis of the form of value starting with
use and exchange value and reaching to the inquiry of
the complex forms of capital.
activity – and with it its societal basis and its
natural resources.
Against this ideological effect, dialectics be-
come salient in Marx’s own theorizing to re-
construct reality from the standpoint of praxis
and, in doing so, to study “the connection of
that which at first appears to be without con-
nection, the connection at the point of origin of
the phenomena which appear as disparate in the
result” (Haug, 2005, p. 246; original emphasis
eliminated). To avoid the “speculative dialec-
tics” of Hegel, Marx emphasizes that in each
case the limits of dialectics need to be deter-
mined and that the difference between the real
object and the epistemic object, between reality
and thinking, should not be neutralized (Marx,
1857/1973; MEW 42, p. 43). This may clarify
why Marx claimed that his version of dialectics
is “not only different from the Hegelian, but is
its direct opposite” (MECW 35, p. 19).
Building on Dialectical Theorizing
The way towards a cultural-historical approach
to human development in Vygotsky’s work
exemplifies how dialectical thinking became
both an inherent topic of theorizing as well
as a method to overcome the limits of given
theoretical insights about consciousness. From
its very beginning Vygotsky’s collaborative
project rejects (a) any dualism between physi-
ological and mental phenomena (and accord-
ingly between their materialistic/objective and
idealistic/subjective explanations) and (b) any
dichotomy of the individual and the society
of which the individual is a constitutive part.
Consequently, dialectics is used for detecting
(a) the connections between physiological and
psychic phenomena and (b) the individual and
societal dimensions that were considered the
result of their co-evolution.
But this insight did not come from a sudden
revelation or discovery of dialectics. Dialecti-
cal thinking can be seen already in the early
works of Vygotsky when he started to elabo-
rate his own approach as a young researcher in
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the Institute of Psychology (Moscow). At that
time, he was concerned with the shortcomings
of Pavlov’s reflexology and its physiological
concepts that neglected human consciousness.
Nevertheless, Vygotsky applied the concept
of reflexes to mental processes and aimed
at developing a wider notion of behavior by
making consciousness an integral part of it.
Thus, he still followed the principle of an “ob-
jective psychology,” but by transferring it to
the domain of consciousness, he imbued the
concepts with inner contradictions and finally
disrupted the framework of reflex theory. (Sil-
vonen [2005] therefore applies Althusser’s no-
tion of an “epistemologic break” to Vygotsky’s
theoretical development.)
Influenced by Gestalt- and Ganzheits-psy-
chology, Vygotsky criticized the behaviorist
associationism for explaining developmental
processes on the basis of isolated elements.
Although he sympathized with the integral or
holistic approach of psychologists like Kurt
Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, or Kurt Lewin, he
found that their analysis lacked a genetic or
socio-historic understanding of psychologi-
cal phenomena. Vygotsky started to rethink
psychological methods according to dialecti-
cal thinking. Following Darwin’s and Marx’s
historico-genetic insight that “the anatomy of
man is the key to the anatomy of the ape,” he
postulated transferring “basic categories and
concepts from the higher to the lower” level
only (Vygotsky, 1927/1987, CW 3, p. 235).
But this method was exactly rejected in Pav-
lov’s theory that applied a physiological con-
cept (“reflex”) observed in animal behavior to
human psychology.
From the historico-genetic perspective, Vy-
gotsky built on the dialectical insight that “the
elaboration of concepts, methods, and theories
takes place within the science itself during the
whole course of scientific knowledge acquisi-
tion, i.e., the transition from one pole to the
other, from fact to concept, is accomplished
without pausing for a single minute” (p. 253).
Vygotsky recognized that each reality as an
object of investigation as well as each scientific
theory and methodology must be conceived as
a historical product of human labor. Thus, “a
theory of method is, of course, the production
of means of production” (p. 253). For his own
psychological approach he emphasized:
We wish to obtain a clear idea of the essence of
individual and social psychology as two aspects
of a single science, and of their historical fate, not
through abstract considerations, but by means of an
analysis of scientific reality. […] The methodologi-
cal investigation utilizes the historical examination
of the concrete forms of the sciences and the theo-
retical analysis of these forms in order to obtain
generalized, verified principles that are suitable for
guidance. (p. 237)
Accordingly, Vygotsky (1978) came to postu-
late that psychological matters should be stud-
ied “in the process of change,” in its “develop-
ment of all its phases and changes” (p. 64-65)
to fulfill the demands of a dialectical method.
More precisely human development was in-
terpreted as a process of enculturation and
humanization, in which biological and cul-
tural lines of development were interrelated
through a co-evolution of the societal basis
as an “environment,” on the one hand, and the
individual development in different forms of
social agency and activity, on the other hand.
To take the various mediations of this de-
velopment into account, Vygotsky (1934/1987)
introduced the notion of a “unit” for the analy-
sis of human behavior. He argued that such a
unit has to be the smallest “part” of the whole,
which nevertheless embodies the whole and
therefore does not reduce the complexity of
the research objects in process.
In our view, an entirely different form of analysis
is fundamental to further development of theories
of thinking and speech. This form of analysis relies
on the partitioning of the complex whole into units.
In contrast to the term “element”, the term “unit”
designates a product of analysis that possesses all
the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is
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a vital and irreducible part of the whole. […] In
precisely the same sense, the living cell is the real
unit of biological analysis because it preserves the
basic characteristics of life that are inherent in the
living organism. A psychology concerned with the
study of the complex whole must comprehend this.
It must replace the method of decomposing the
whole into its elements with that of partitioning
the whole into its units. Psychology must identify
those units in which the characteristics of the whole
are present, even though they may be manifested in
altered form. Using this mode of analysis, it must
attempt to resolve the concrete problems that face
us. (pp. 46-47)
Vygotsky suggested that the notion of “word
meaning” (as well as “emotional experience”
[perezhivanie], Vygotsky, 1934/1998, p. 294;
cf. van der Veer, 2001, p. 101) would enable
such a unit analysis, because it is not only “a
unity of thinking and speech" but also “a unity 
of generalization and social interaction, a unity 
of thinking and communication" (1934/1987,
p. 49), and thus, it would not “divorce the
communicative function of speech from its
intellectual function” (p. 48).
On the basis of this unit analysis, Vy-
gotsky’s approach provides an understanding
of the development of higher psychic func-
tions and their “the genetic roots” (p. 51) that
no longer sees them in isolation, only to be
added or associated to one another in differ-
ent stages; instead, each psychological func-
tion is comprehensible only when we see it
as a part of an interfunctional structure which
ontogenetically co-evolves within a certain so-
ciocultural environment. Feeling and thinking,
for example, could not be understood when
they are investigated as separated phenomena
detached from a person’s social life.
There exists a dynamic meaningful system that
constitutes a unity of affective and intellectual 
processes. Every idea contains some remnant of
the individual’s affective relationship to that aspect
of reality which it represents. In this way, analysis
into units makes it possible to see the relationship
between the individual’s needs or inclinations and
his thinking. It also allows us to see the opposite
relationship, the relationship that links his thoughts
to the dynamics of behavior, to the concrete ac-
tivity of the personality. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987,
pp. 50-51)
Vygotsky excavates three dimensions of me-
diation taking place—the use of sign, the use
of tools, and social interaction or cooperation.
Therefore, the late Vygotskian approach can
be acknowledged as a theoretical perspective
that comprises all these different forms of me-
diation in relation with each other (Silvonen,
2005), thus providing a dialectical method to
comprehend matters of research in its move-
ments, transitions, interactions, conflicts
and contradictions. Yet, although Vygotsky
(1927/1987) believed that “the laws of thinking
and the laws of nature correspond necessarily
with each other as soon as they are known
properly” (p. 256; see also Engels, 1925/1978,
p. 493), he also recognized the socio-historical
limits of theorizing, because “when the mate-
rial [of scientific investigation] is carried to
the highest degree of generalization possible
in [one] science, further generalization is pos-
sible only beyond the boundaries of the given
science and by comparing it with the material
of a number of adjacent sciences” (Vygotsky,
1927/1987, p. 254).
Section Summary
Within the development of Vygotsky’s work,
we conceive a practice of theorizing through
the lenses of Hegel and Marx, but which nev-
ertheless shows its own history of transferring
and transforming these approaches in view of
specific objects of study (“Forschungsgegen-
stände”) and its determinations through scien-
tific research. Most salient about Vygotsky’s
dialectical thinking is that it radically takes
into account that human practice as social in-
teraction, collaboration, and human develop-
ment cannot be adequately theorized if it is
reduced to a self-reliant, thing-like “object”.
It is a socio-historical, shifting, and multi-di-
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mensional object of study (“Gegenstand”) that
cannot be investigated by looking at isolated
elements or components but by determining
relevant “units” of it only.
To extract a more general idea of the previ-
ous discussion, we argue that several dimen-
sions of dialectics are important in order to
understand and recognize the potential of
CHAT’s theorizing of human practice and
development, as it builds on the following
principles of dialectical thinking:
study a phenomenon in its most developed
form as a way toward explaining its previ-
ous forms (historico-genetic perspective);
study the whole instead of isolated parts
or elements to preserve the inner relations
between the parts of a whole (holistic per-
spective);
reduce the complexity of the objects of in-
vestigation without reducing them to false
abstractions (structuralist, integral, or or-
ganic perspective);
study a phenomenon in the process of
change (perspective on dynamics, media-
tions and transformations); and
reflect the process of theorizing and de-
termine the (historical) limits of scienti-
fic concepts, insights and generalizations
(self-critical perspective).
These perspectives, of course, do not guar-
antee a socio-critical theory, but they help to
understand a practice-based co-evolution be-
tween the natural and the social or between
the social and the individual lines of develop-
ment (instead of their dualistic comprehen-
sion), and to conceive such objects of study as
something constituted and changed by societal
relations instead of a constantly remaining and
stable thing. Everything needs to be seen both
as determining and determined within its re-
lation to other things but the scope and the
scale of their impact can differ. Accordingly,






need to be reflected as products of societal 
forms of perception, thought, and practice and
therefore, scientific investigation may lead to
discover possibilities to intervene.
But dialectics precisely does not (and
should not) serve here as an “instrument” to
overcome the shortfalls of traditional forms of
investigation. This would imply a misunder-
standing, namely to look for dialectics merely
as a method. We should not expect it to be
something that could simply be “applied” to
research matters like a standardized procedure
or even a tool. Instead, dialectical thinking be-
comes a challenge to constantly question a
variety of presuppositions concerning research
practices: why and how something should be
investigated and how this precipitates certain
scientific representations of reality, which in-
terrelations can be recognized as essential and
how their genesis can be explained, who gets
involved in a research project and who is not,
what are the means and methods of inquiry,
where do they come from, and what role(s) are
they playing in the research process (cf. Nis-
sen & Langemeyer, 2005). This questioning is
paramount when a critical approach is elabo-
rated and when scientific thinking is developed
as a practice of emancipatory intervention.
How can Dialectical
Notions be Misunderstood
in a Functionalistic and
Systemic Way?
It is in this spirit of CHAT as dialectical sci-
ence that we also raise fundamental questions
concerning our own subject position as re-
searchers within a certain research field—what
roles we are playing in it and how we deal
with the presuppositions of our own research
activities—which has become a tightrope walk
for probably every researcher nowadays, since
increasingly, the conditions and the guidelines
for research are predetermined by institutions
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or enterprises that finance projects, how they
select applications, or accredit research activi-
ties and their outcomes. Therefore, the main
intent of problematizing the use of concepts
and visual representations in Engeström’s pub-
lications is not so much to show a lack of qual-
ity, because his texts consistently develop their
argumentation and often corroborate it with
wide empirical research; rather, we want to
make those researchers attracted to this version
of CHAT aware of several fundamental prob-
lems in it—related to a misinterpretation of
dialectical concepts—that tend to impair criti-
cal engagement in the contemporary academe
and today’s research fields. Thus, we discuss
the ways CHAT needs further elaboration to
meet these challenges so that it continues to
develop.
Following the self-critical perspective, our
analysis questions the notion of activity as it
is represented and interpreted by a triangular
model to discuss its impingement on guiding
and interpreting empirical research. Accord-
ing to the holistic perspective, we examine
how subject, object, and their relationship
are theorized by Engeström as “units” and
in what ways they tend to be reified as iso-
lated elements. With regard to the historical
development of societal practice, we explore
why Engeström’s notion of activity (and its
triangular representation) proves rather in-
different about the broader societal relations
that determine practice and by which human
activities develop historically. Connected to
this, we discuss why a genetic reconstruction
of specific human activities including the ex-
amination of their dynamics and transforma-
tions is quite difficult by means of an “activ-
ity system” that tends to blur the distinction
between the individual and the societal level.
From the structuralist perspective, we inves-
tigate the capacity of the triangular model to
grasp essential interrelations of human activity
and how these interrelations are considered.
But first of all, we begin with a brief outline
of Engeström’s own commitment to dialectical
thinking to determine what his theory aims
at.
Some Problematic Implications
of “Activity Systems” and their
Triangular Representation
In a general reflection on human activity,
Engeström acknowledges the importance of
dialectics, or more precisely, of dialectical
concepts because “[c]ontrary to the common
notions, dialectics does not see ‘concrete’ as
something sensually palpable and ‘abstract’ as
something conceptual or mentally constructed.
‘Concrete’ is rather the holistic quality of sys-
temic interconnectedness” (Engeström, 1987,
ch. 4). While searching for systemic interre-
lations inherent to human activity and its ho-
listic notion, Engeström defines “the task of
genuine concept formation” as to find out “the
developmental ‘germ cell’, the initial genetic
abstraction, of the totality under investigation”
and “to develop it into its full concrete diver-
sity.” Herein would lie “the kernel of the ‘other
logic’ Vygotsky pleaded for but could never
formulate” (1987, ch. 4). To compensate this
lack, Engeström determines and depicts the
“activity system” as a triangular model:
The lineage from Hegel to Marx and En-
gels, and further to Ilyenkov and Davydov
[…] suggests that the models needed here are
of the germ cell type, expressing the geneti-
cally original inner contradiction of the system
under scrutiny. Such models function not just
as devices for diagnosing the behavioral state
of the given closed system but as means for
tracing and projecting the genesis and expan-
sive transitions, or ‘fluctuations,’ of an open
system. I suggest that the triangle models of
activity […] may be considered as an attempt
at such modelling. (Ch. 4)




















Figure 1. The “triangle of activity,” has 
become emblematic for cultural-historical 
activity theory.
In Developmental Work Research, this triangle
is presented as the extension of Vygotsky’s
model for a psychological mediation,7 enlarged
by three triangles at the bottom to represent an
activity as the new unit of analysis (Engeström,
2005, p. 60). This unit now contains, besides
the subject, object, and the mediating artifact
in the upper triangle, the mediating conditions
of an activity indicated at the bottom: the divi-
sion of labor, community, and rules. Thus, an
activity system is supposed to represent col-
lective forms of practice and should allow not
only grasping the entire structure of an activity,
but also the history of practices, its changes
and developments. This “history may become
manageable” if “a collective activity system is
taken as the unit” of analysis” (p. 25). In the
context of workplace learning, Engeström sug-
gests including even two interacting activity
systems in the “unit of analysis” to understand,
beyond individual learning, collective learning
processes by which societal practices (activi-
ties) are developed and transformed across the
boundaries of activity systems (p. 62).
Engeström problematizes that “the con-
cept and structure of activity are treated as
if something rather self-explanatory” (p. 25)
 7 In fact, Vygotsky did not invent the triangle to model a
mediated act as Engeström interprets it. He only used
the triangle to contradict the associationism of Pavlov’s
reflexology that depicted learning as an immediate con-
ditioning of a stimulus to a reflex. The mediation did
not refer to the relation between subject and object, but
still to the one between stimulus and response.
and proposes, that in order “to take full ad-
vantage of the concept of activity in concrete
research,” it would be necessary “to create and
test models which explicate the components
and internal relations of an activity systems”
(p. 29). If this demand includes the triangular
model of an activity system, we can acknowl-
edge that Engeström’s approach is consistent
with what has been exposed in the last section
as the perspectives of dialectical thinking. He
agrees with the general objective of activity
theory to overcome dichotomies between the
individual and cultural or societal nature of
activity (p. 20), between object-related activ-
ity and communication (p. 32), and thereby
surmount “the individualist and ahistorical
biases inherent in theories of action” (p. 22).
Engeström also aims at taking account of the
real practices not as “fully predictable, ratio-
nal and ‘machine-like’” actions, but rather as
processes that “involve failures, disruptions
and unexpected innovations” (p. 32), and seeks
to “illuminate the underlying contradictions
which give rise to those failures and innova-
tions as if ‘behind the backs’ of the conscious
actors” (p. 32). In addition, he considers the
activity system to be “a multi-voiced forma-
tion” in which “the different voices” are “lay-
ers in a pool of complementary competencies”
(p. 35).
Each theoretical explanation about the tri-
angular depiction of an activity system may
be connected to a convincing argument; how-
ever, in sum, they seem to be questionable and
rather unclear: Since the model is supposed
to represent the entire activity, it evokes the
questions about how it can simultaneously rep-
resent a “germ cell” and reduce the complexity
of the whole in a “manageable way” when
we investigate work place structures and theo-
rize their implications for human development
(cf. Langemeyer, 2005a). And if the triangular
model is to guide us here, does it really pro-
vide a holistic perspective on the basis of an
activity system or does it turn to an unfortunate
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encounter with a systemic totality? In other
words, does the model really register those
interrelations that render an activity system
into an irreducible and undividable whole or
does it suggest completeness by means of a
systemic figure only? In the latter case, we
would run the risk of losing the social and
societal complexity of human practice, before
we have been able to recognize it.
This leads us to question more concretely
how the single triangle can help to compre-
hend any change or movement within the
activity represented except in its outcome.
It is invisible, for example, how the subject
transforms the object of activity and how it
simultaneously appropriates its own nature,
its body, and how it develops its potentials
and capacities. The representation appears to
suggest that the subject’s motives and inten-
tions to become engaged in a certain activ-
ity would be identical with its outcome(s).
It therefore reminds us of an instrumentalist
concept of action that focuses—like Max
Weber—on the rationality of means and ends.
Furthermore, one can get the impression that
(a) the constituents of this system (subject,
object, tool, community, rules, and division
of labor) are mutually determining each other,
(b) these determinations are essential for
every component, and (c) as long as the activ-
ity is going on, these components remain the
same. Otherwise we would have to conclude
that the model does not capture an irreduc-
ible and holistic unit of the essential inner
structure of human practice. But because it
simultaneously tries to recognize the entire
complexity of any activity in general, we ask
whether this model leads researchers to find
its constituents, before looking for its specific
relationships, interdependencies, determina-
tions, and changes in practice. This would
imply seeing them, first of all, as self-reliant
elements. In other words, is there a danger that
a researcher is led to start from a perspective 
that s/he immediately has to repel, if s/he tries 
to reinvent the perspectives of dialectical 
thinking in her/his research activity?
We acknowledge that models always ex-
clude some aspects and interrelations to
highlight others. But if we follow the sub-
ject-object-axis, the triangular model favors a
third-person perspective, rather than a subjec-
tive or an intersubjective view. This inherently
implies that the logic of the system is that of
the analyst, the “neutral observer,” rather than
that of the participant.8 Otherwise it could be
important for example to represent the reasons 
for acting (“Handlungsbegründungen”) and
the perceived possibilities for acting (“Han-
dlungsmöglichkeiten”) of those who are in-
volved in a certain practice. In work relations,
for example, the possibilities to assign a task
to somebody, to take on a certain responsibil-
ity, or to refuse it are in general very different
for employees. Since the participants’ power,
influence, competence, and interests vary, their
subjective reasons to get engaged in a certain
activity and the ways in which they act are
heterogeneous. If we identify every employee
with the “subject” in the model, we would
favor a homogeneous subject position and
neglect the differences in subjective reasons
to act and consequently heterogeneous ways of
acting, too. But if the triangle may be read as
representing our, the analysts’ perspective, it
does not depict our position in or our relation
to the activity system either.
We admit that up to now, these critical
questions have been directed at the triangular
model only. But can we also detect such am-
biguities and lacks of clarity in other texts that
theorize and deal with empirical data?
 8 It is irrelevant for this argument that in several research
projects, participants also use the model to come to a
better understanding of their own work practice, for
example. We do not deny that the triangular model
could be an opportunity to reflect and discuss different
perspectives of those who are involved. However, such
an appropriation of the model does not refer to what it
actually visualizes.
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Reading exemplary cases of
theorizing and research practice
First case: Let us take an example from
Developmental Work Research (Engeström,
2005). To clarify the inseparable unity of
activity and communication, a work situa-
tion described by Hart-Landberg and Reder
(1997, p. 365) from a manufacturing plant is
presented:
The Rexford, a machine for grinding metal bars into
components for automobile accessories, “crashed.”
Teresa was just concluding her first week operating
it. Team members milled around, trying to figure
out the cause of the crash. To anyone who was
listening, Teresa expressed her guilty feelings: “It
had to have something to do with the operator.”
Jeff disagreed. “The same thing has happened
to all of us.” Then he warned her that the tool-
ing experts assigned to troubleshoot this problem
probably would tease her as they teased all opera-
tors involved in such breakdowns. Immediately an
expert arrived and took Teresa aside to talk to her.
Later another young machinist of the team, Car-
rie, told the observing author that the problem of
Teresa’s machine had not been her fault: It was the
machine’s. “Some of the best machinists come out
from a situation where the machine crashes all the
time,” Carrie maintained.
In the aftermath of the breakdown, an item on
the team meeting agenda was: “Update on the Rex-
ford.” Chuck, the team’s oldest worker, with years
of experience operating and fixing the machine,
recounted that after the crash he had “rebuilt,”
“remade,” “realigned,” and “recentered” all the
Rexford parts which had been “wiped out really
bad,” “burnt up,” “shoved back,” and “had gullies
in them.” After participants stopped chuckling at
the extent of Chuck’s chores, he asserted, “It’s not
Teresa’s fault.” But Teresa still seemed worried
about her culpability: “It was only the second time
I’ve loaded bars... but Emily loaded a similar bar
[with no resulting breakdown].”
Participants then launched into a technical analy-
sis of a bar size and developed a new recording
procedure for tracking undersize bars to prevent
future breakdowns. Thus the team’s response to
the breakdown was to support Teresa and attempt
to improve the production process by creating a
new type of written record. (Quoted in Engeström,
2005, p. 139)
Engeström presents this example as a “nice
illustration” for how “organization emerges
in the interplay between conversation and
text,” namely through “a new type of writ-
ten record as a response to the breakdown”
(p. 139). The text is used to problematize
conversation and critical discourse analysis
for neglecting the “continuous change and
developmental struggle” (p. 141) and to criti-
cize the “‘distance’ between practical activity
and discourse” (p. 144) as well as the lack of
“an explicit interest in and analysis of radical
transformations” (p. 155). Although this cri-
tique may be adequate and striking, we shall
read the way in which Engeström proceeds to
argue in a symptomal way: we shall look for
aspects, questions, and explanations that are
left out and assumptions that are not further
explicated for they seem to be evident. In other
words, we want to pay attention to issues that
Engeström leaves unproblematic.
Most significant in the introduction seems
to be the fact, that we, as readers, are not
informed about how the authors of the quoted
passage were engaged in their “ethnographic
study of teamwork and literacy” (p. 139).
We are not provided with an explanation
about what the original authors were doing
in their research project and why. Neither do
we know who really observed and reported
this situation, what has been selected to pres-
ent and what has been ignored. Therefore,
the purpose and status of this original text
remains rather unreflected. Neglecting all this
presupposes something like an unproblematic
third-person’s perspective. Thus, it becomes
significant that another text is quoted and
interpreted as if it were a neutral record of
a situation that only “looks for” a scientific
analysis. Because Engeström does not prob-
lematize it as a theoretically biased percep-
tion and product of research activity, he also
omits other plausible ways of interpreting the
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object of study that would be contrary to his
conclusion.
Engeström suggests that “the conver-
sational events […] may be interpreted as
attempts to influence the recipient’s beliefs
and actions” as for example: “The team
members reassured Teresa, and the tooling
expert assumedly teased Teresa making her
feel guilty” which could be a sign for “com-
peting ways of enacting organizational power
structures by asserting authority over an indi-
vidual worker” (p. 140). Engeström argues
that this conclusion would be insufficient, if
we do not relate it to the fact that “the crucial
outcome is a new production procedure for
tracking the bars” (p. 140). And instead of
reducing organizations “to small fragments
of discourse,” we would have to acknowledge
that they “carry histories” (p. 142). How-
ever, in the Rexford case, Engeström does
not present additional information about the
histories of that specific work procedure and
the workers’ relationships or the management
and the organization that characterize their
work places as well as their forms of col-
laboration within the company. He suggests
that the “whole incident [that Teresa showed
self-criticism] may be interpreted as a fairly
complex systematic disturbance in the activ-
ity, rather than just another demonstration of
power relations” (p. 147). But what is the
evidence for this thesis? To corroborate it,
Engeström invokes the triangular model and
reinterprets the moment and the aftermath of
the breakdown of the machine as a “distur-
bance” of an activity system.
A first figure shows “Teresa’s doubts and
confusion regarding her own possible contri-
bution to the disturbance” as well as “reas-
surance and support from team members to
Teresa” (p. 147-148). Another figure visual-
izes the “conversation between Teresa and the
tooling expert” to find out “with what intel-
lectual tools might one diagnose and repair
the crash” (p. 148). A third figure represents
the activity of Chuck telling a story about the
repairing and the “outcome being a closure on
the repair of the machine” (p. 149). A fourth
figure depicts the “development of the new
recording procedure in the team meeting”
(p. 149).
It is surprising that these figures represent
certain ways of being of a singular person and
others show at best their individual actions,
but illustrated as activities. This is confusing
with regard to Leont’ev’s distinction between
action and activity where the latter is the col-
lective, cultural-historically developed prac-
tice of humans to achieve a certain form of
need satisfaction and the former is a contribu-
tion to this collaboration. Since the triangular
model seems to be applicable to intra- and
interpersonal activities (like inner speech,
communication, and collaborative activities)
as well as societal practices (like an entire
production process) and tends to identify a
personal motive with the outcome(s) of an
activity, it seems to ignore essential differ-
ences between the societal, the intra- and the
interpersonal plane of human practice. This
would surely impair a historico-genetic per-
spective on how specific activities develop and
change under certain, more general, societal
conditions.9 Furthermore, our assumption or
fear that subjects, objects, tools and so on are
“assembled” as isolated elements can also be
affirmed for neither Teresa nor Chuck appear
as subjects who are situated in the given col-
laboration due to their subjective vital inter-
ests (Lebensinteressen), to a certain mode of
participation and to the ways of being recog-
nized by others (cf. Dreier, 1999; Holzkamp,
1993).10 Instead, the figures represent them as
 9 An example for this would be the investigation of dif-
ferent work processes that get reshaped through the
implementation of information and communication
technologies.
 10 Erik Axel and Morten Nissen (1993) have already dis-
cussed in what ways work the distinction between the
individual and the societal level of activity is blurred
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actors without subjective reasons to act, sepa-
rated from their own interpretive horizons,
biographies, and social positions or status
(as gender, age or competence/qualification,
for example). We do not know, for example,
what it really means for Teresa to experi-
ence the breakdown of the machine while
operating it. Is she afraid of sanctions or of
being disregarded as an unqualified woman,
for example? Nor can we really interpret the
motives for the support coming from other
team members. This could be a fair manner to
deal with problems at work, but it could also
be a strategy to ensure the competitiveness
of the team according to what currently is
investigated as new economized organization
structures and forms of “lean management.”
In such a case, we might expect that beneath
the support remains a quite painful pressure
to perform. Such a plausible scenario could
explain why Teresa keeps worrying about her
own contribution to the breakdown despite
getting support from different angles. Yet, this
conclusion would need more empirical data
and a thorough investigation that would also
require a dialectical analysis of that praxis,
especially in face of a co-existence of coop-
eration and competition.
By showing some alternative ways of
inquiry and interpretation, here, we seek to
clarify that the triangular representations of
in Leont’ev’s work and which problems are connected
to this: “Paradoxically, […] the attempt to unify social
and individual activity by the category of motive opens
the road to separate options: Determining activity by
its motive, we are caught oscillating between the two
poles in a dichotomy in the theoretical functions of
the concept of motive. At one pole, motives depict
how the individual merges into societal activity; at
the other, they depict how the individual regulates her
individual and not necessarily societal activity. Fur-
thermore, defining an activity by its motive paves the
way for subjective arbitrariness in research. Deciding
whether an object of investigation is an activity or an
action is a matter of what sort of motive configuration
the researcher sees or reads into the individual under
investigation.” (p.71)
the supposedly activity “systems” neglect the
ambivalent and contradictory nature of such
relationships and the entire situatedness of the
subjects involved. This indicates that the sub-
jects, tools, and objects and so on are treated
as “constituents” or “elements,” and tend to
be reified with all the other “elements” of an
activity to fit into a system structure, because
each of them is divorced from several cultural-
historical dimensions and social-individual
meanings that vividly bring about and influ-
ence societal praxis.
Certainly, this focus on systemic structures
corresponds to what the analysis seeks to re-
veal as “‘invisible’ disruptions and creative
efforts in activity and communication” to make
“visible the scripts and boundaries of ‘normal
operation’” (Engeström, 2005, p. 152). This
implies—actually quite similar to conversation
analysis—that individual perspectives are only
of interest in so far as they explain something
of these scripts and boundaries. Engeström
suggests that there is a striving inherent in
activity to overcome boundaries by creating
new scripts, operations, communications, and
procedures but we do not find sufficient reflec-
tions on this striving as a personal motive/mo-
tivation for change.
Furthermore, Engeström’s argument against
conversation and discourse analysis that,
“while power and domination are at work in
contradictions, it is important to distinguish
contradictions from a general assertion of
asymmetric power relations” (p. 152). How-
ever, we may doubt that a full understanding
is achieved in the presented framework con-
cerning the scale of how power relations af-
fect practices through their impact on human
relationships and subjectivities. To investigate
these shortcomings, we draw on another case
study, published and conducted by the same
author.
Second case: In what follows, we discuss
a project carried out in 1998 and published
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with the title “Expansive Learning at Work:
Toward an Activity Theoretical Reconceptu-
alization” (Engeström, 2001; republished in
2005). It took place in the area of children’s
health care in Helsinki and sought to improve
the collaboration between two different institu-
tions. The report presents it as an exemplary
case for a real developmental process achieved
through “expansive learning at work.” Such a
collaborative learning process maintained by
these institutions would have been necessary,
because “the issue at stake was organisational,
not resolvable by a sum total of separate indi-
viduals” (Engeström, 2001, p. 140):
A critical structural issue in the Helsinki area is the
excessive use of high-end hospital services, histori-
cally caused by a concentration of hospitals in this
area. In children’s medical care, the high-end of
medicine is represented by the Children’s Hospital
which has a reputation of monopolizing its patients
and not actively encouraging them to use primary
care health centre services. Due to rising costs,
there is now much political pressure to change this
division of labour in favour of increased use of
primary care services. The problem is most acute
among children with long-term illnesses, especially
those with multiple or unclear diagnoses. […] Such
children often drift between caregiver organiza-
tions without anyone having overview and overall
responsibilities of the child’s care trajectory. This
puts a heavy burden on the families and on the
society. (p. 139)
Given that political pressure was exercised
on the hospital and services indicates that,
already from the beginning, the problem of
the collective learning process was more or
less defined. Only the way of improvement
was practically unresolved. Thus, the idea to
change something came from the outside, from
a higher political level. However, the employ-
ees in the health care system and the families
were determined to be the subjects of learning.
Engeström reports: “The Children’s Hospital
decided to respond to the pressures by initiat-
ing and hosting a collaborative redesign ef-
fort, facilitated by our research group using a
method called Boundary Crossing Laboratory"
(p. 139). But what we do not know is whether
this decision was supported by everyone in this
context or whether there has been even a form
of resistance against the changes to come. In
many countries, the imperative to economize
public services is currently prevailing. Under
this condition, the employees of that hospital
could likely have distrusted any attempt to
reduce costs, since this might be the onset of
further cuts. Maybe nothing like this affected
the intended learning process, because the
changes seemed to lead to a win-win situation
for everyone, yet it is nothing but extraordi-
nary when resistance and ill-will against the
pressure to re-organize and economize one’s
work or against a normative pedagogical ven-
ture arise already beforehand.
Disregarding such impacts of a more gen-
eral political situation, the article explains the
“learning challenge” concerned “a new way
of working in which parents and practitioners
from different caregiver organisations will
collaboratively plan and monitor the child’s
trajectory of care, taking joint responsibility
for its overall progress” (p. 139). Moreover,
Engeström emphasizes that “there was no
readily available model that would fix the
problems” and that “top-down commands
and guidelines [were] of little value when the
management [did] not know what the content
of such directives should be” (pp. 139-140).
However, he does not highlight the fact that
neither the employees nor the families had in-
fluence on how the problem was defined from
the beginning. Their perspectives were not
present nor articulated when the Laboratory
was initiated. Furthermore, the presupposition
for what Engeström calls, following Gregory
Bateson, “Learning III” (which means that, in
the beginning, the solution and the meta-theo-
retical problem are unclear), was actually not
fulfilled: first, because the task was determined
from a higher political instance so that the pur-
pose of learning represented a normative goal,
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second, because the researchers already knew
about similar “disturbances” in organisational
structures and workplaces and introduced an
elaborated method to guide the participants to
solve the underlying problem. Later the article
states more precisely where the actual problem
would lie. It explains that, in the past, “care
relationships and critical paths were solutions
created in response to particular historical sets
of contradictions.” However, “they do not help
in dealing with patients with unclear and mul-
tiple diagnoses and they tend to impose their
disease-centred world view even on primary
care practitioners.” Consequently, the prevail-
ing concepts would have caused “great diffi-
culties in representing and guiding horizontal
and socio-spatial relations and interactions
between care providers located in different
institutions, including the patient and his/her
family as the most important actor in care”
(pp. 143-144).
We do not intend to question here the cor-
rectness or the advantage of this interpretation.
We rather want to highlight that it represents
the official discourse within these institutions
but not the different individual perspectives of
the practitioners and the families. Their beliefs
and views (their interpretive horizons) may
have been in agreement with the official line,
but we cannot take this for sure. Sometimes
people only reproduce what they have been
told while thinking in fact quite differently.
Therefore, we have to reflect on the quality
and validity of verbal data. A well-known
problem is that personal beliefs and perspec-
tives are also quite problematic and disturbing
for researchers and are therefore neglected,
disregarded or even excluded as irrational or
non-representative.
In fact, in what follows, we notice that the
research group advised the practitioners to ac-
cept exactly the perspectives of “horizontal
and socio-spatial relations and interactions”.
This ‘insight’ therefore seems to be a product
of instructions rather than one of (expansive)
learning. Furthermore, also the setting in
which the Laboratory took place was shaped
according to the ideas of the research group,
namely the three assumed activity systems:
the children’s hospital, the primary health care
centre, and the child’s family.
In the Boundary Crossing Laboratory, the basic
constellation of the three activity systems was
implemented so that hospital practitioners sat at
one side of the room and primary care health centre
practitioners sat on another side of the room. The
voices of patients’ families came from the front
of the room, from videotapes made by following
patients through their hospital and health centre
visits and also from actual parents we invited to
join in the sessions. (p. 140)
First of all, one recognizes that room for in-
tersubjectivity (the text includes the terms
“multiperspectivity” and “multivoicedness”)
was given, but it was limited for anticipated
reasons: The videotapes of families and pa-
tients, as Engeström explains, “made it virtu-
ally impossible for the participants to blame
the clients for the problems and added greatly
to the urgency of the double bind” (p. 140).
Later on readers are informed about another
conflict, a “tension” between the perspectives
of centres and hospitals, but it is not evident
how this became apparent during the discus-
sions in the Laboratory: “Health centres in the
Helsinki area [were] blaming the university
hospital for high costs, while the university
hospital criticize[d] health centres for exces-
sive referrals and for not being able to take
care of patients who [did] not necessarily need
hospital care” (p. 145). Although the delimita-
tion of such a conflict potential can be justified
for several good reasons, it would be impor-
tant to theoretically reflect these strategies to
prevent certain dynamics and developments in
communication and interaction and to foster
others. Thus, despite claims to the contrary,
aspects of “learning III”—multiperspectivity,
multivoicedness, and expansive learning—are
not salient in this research report.
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Since the learners’ subjective perspective
on the situation is neglected to a certain ex-
tent, we shall look closer at the answer to:
“Why do they learn—What makes them
make the effort?” (p. 141) Without referring
to interview data, Engeström suggests that
“motivation for risky expansive learning pro-
cesses associated with major transformations
in activity systems is not well explained by
mere participation and gradual acquisition of
mastery” (pp. 141-142). Instead he consider
(according to Bateson) “double binds gener-
ated by contradictory demands imposed on the
participants” to be the driving force for their
learning. Therefore, “we made the participants
face and articulate the contradictory demands
inherent in their work activity by presenting
a series of troublesome patient cases cap-
tured on videotape” (p. 142). Here again we
notice that not only the initiation for learning
came from the “outside,” from the research
group, but also the introduction of the object
of learning (Lerngegenstand). The question
whether this raised in fact the motivation of
the participants to learn, to solve the problems,
and to take risks, however, remains unclear.
Engeström articulates contradictory demands
to be the motive of learning, but without con-
sidering that motivations can be torn apart or
go in different directions: The assumed motive
to solve contradictions could be mixed with
other motives like pleasing the boss to gain
or reassure some privileges. This could bring
about competitive behavior among team mem-
bers, or disapproval and resentment, which
would affect collective learning unintendedly
or even unconsciously. But Engeström does
not develop any concepts or representations
in relation to his triangular model to reflect
such contradictory dimensions. In the follow-
ing paragraphs that are supposed to clarify,
what the practitioners were learning, we can
see even more clearly which and why certain
dimensions are neglected.
Engeström reports, that “the researchers
suggested the term ‘knot-working’ to capture
the idea of the new pattern of activity” (p. 147),
which is an expanded one, and in a “Change-
Laboratory”-session the idea of a “‘care agree-
ment’ emerged as the central new concept”
(p. 148). The question of how it “emerged”
does not seem so important, because in what
follows, we can only read the transcript of a
discussion about the practicability of such an
agreement. While the nurse attempts to see the
“care agreement” as a chance for improvement,
she also problematizes the additional work for
nurses. But exactly this argument against the
“care agreement” and the problem of how the
increased responsibilities and the work load
could be dealt with according to the new divi-
sion of labor did not become a matter of con-
cern. A data security specialist in fact inter-
rupted the nurse by giving an argument for the
newly found “solution.” Then, two physicians
implicitly denied that there would be any ad-
ditional work—which might have been correct,
but the article does not make it clear. Finally,
an information system specialist concluded eu-
phorically: “In my opinion, this is a great sys-
tem, and as an outsider I say, implement this as
soon as possible so that after a sufficient trial
period we can duplicate this system elsewhere.
This is a great system” (p. 148).
In sum, the excerpt may reveal discursive
strategies to suppress the nurse’s objections to
the “solution” that was partially introduced and
favoured by the research group and partially
“found” by the practitioners. In this quoted ex-
change, the nurse, as being in a lower position
than the physicians and the specialists, could
have been engendered as the only woman in
this context, and therefore was unable to pres-
ent her fears as powerful as it would have been
necessary to raise interest for her concerns.
All these signs that might indicate some prob-
lems of power relations are not discussed nor
reflected in the text. Moreover, different inter-
pretation possibilities are not considered or at
least not presented. And there is more in the
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specialist’s conclusion: Although it may not be
a surprise for the technical vocabulary it con-
tains, as it fits with other specific professional
expressions of the specialist’s work, readers
may wonder why this is not problematized as
a functionalistic or technicistic misunderstand-
ing of expansive learning, of its nature and its
purpose.
At this point, we have to relate these blank
spaces in the text to the theoretical framework,
because technical terms like “system,” “knot-
working” and “implementation” are used
(pp. 153, 155). Although such a vocabulary
is used metaphorically, it nurtures reifications
of societal human practice and functionalistic
views suggesting that an activity is something
that could be taken from one context and be
installed in another. This interpretation of an
activity system as a unit of analysis neglects
a subjective as well as a wider societal plane
in which contradictions occur. Accordingly,
we continue to investigate where fundamen-
tal problems of the concept of activity system
lie and proceed by dealing with the notion of
contradictions (cf. Langemeyer, 2005b).
What are Contradictions?
How is Development Achieved?
Engeström’s Notion of Contradictions
and Development
Drawing on Hegel’s discovery of “inner con-
tradictions” as responsible for a movement of
consciousness, Engeström adopts this concept
and considers them also to be “the source of
dynamics and development in human activ-
ity” (1987, ch. 2). A contradiction would be
a “historically accumulated dynamic tension
between opposing forces in an activity sys-
tem” that “constantly generates disturbances
which open up opportunities and call for novel
solutions that can lead to transformations in
the system” (Engeström, 2005, p. 152). In re-
lation to the “expansive cycle of an activity
system,” which represents a collective learn-
ing process that brings about such transitions,
Engeström also highlights the significant role
of “internal contradictions as the driving
force of change and development” (p. 61).
Elsewhere denoted as “systemic”, contradic-
tions are interpreted “as tensions within and
between the nodes of the activity system ag-
gravated by the asynchronous development
of the different elements" (Engeström, 2000,
p. 153, our emphasis). Furthermore, “outside
influences from neighbouring activity systems
[would] constantly enter into the local systems
and trigger novel developmental processes”
(p. 165). Engeström distinguishes between dif-
ferent types of contradictions:
In the analysis of human activity, four levels or
layers of contradictions may be discerned. […]
The primary contradiction of activities in capitalist
socio-economic formations lives as the inner con-
flict between exchange value and use value within
each corner of the triangle of activity. The sec-
ondary contradictions are those appearing between
the corners. […] The tertiary contradiction appears
when representatives of culture […] introduce the
object and motive of a culturally more advanced
form of the central activity into the dominant form
of the central activity. […] The quaternary con-
tradictions require that we take into consideration
the essential ‘neighbour activities’ linked with the
central activity which is the original object of our
study. (Engeström, 1987, chap. 2)
The inner contradiction would manifest itself
above all in a “primary contradiction,” which
derives from that “dual existence" of any tool
or instrument in capitalist societies as use- and
exchange-value (1987, ch.2). An example for
this issue is the work activity of a physician
that “includes a tremendous variety of medica-
ments and drugs” which are “not just useful
preparations” but “above all commodities with
prices, manufactured for a market, advertised
and sold for profit.” Accordingly, “every doc-
tor faces this contradiction in his daily deci-
sion making” (ibid.) and, furthermore, would
have to face “patients as people to heal” as
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well as “sources of income” (Engeström, 2000,
p. 152).
“Contradictions” may therefore accumu-
late within some tool, such as a drug, or be-
tween two “elements” of an activity system
(e.g. between instruments and objects) since
they are interpreted as “tensions within and
between the nodes” (see above). According
to the thesis that such tensions (“inner con-
tradictions”) would lead to a change in the
system, contradictions could also appear as
“small innovations in practitioners’ everyday
work actions” (Engeström, 2000, p. 153). But
in the particular example of a primary contra-
diction, we may doubt that it leads to such a
desirable change. Political interventions would
be necessary to control the market of drugs,
but these do not emerge through a physician’s
central activity “from below” or within its
own domain, nor would they be immediately
a consequence of “contradictions” between
a hospital’s and a pharmaceutical company’s
activity system. The tension between the use-
and the exchange-value as well as the distur-
bances of two interacting “activity systems”
are misinterpreted as “inner contradictions”
and therefore do not serve as an explanation
for development. With regard to the capitalist
rationality of profit making, we would need a
societal concept of contradiction instead of a
notion that actually refers to a state of indi-
vidual consciousness.
These counter-arguments relate to what
Peter E. Jones (2003 and 2004) criticizes as
a misconception in Engeström’s version of
CHAT. His theory, Jones argues, fails to realize
the analytical difference of use- and exchange-
value, because Marx “was distinguishing
[the] process [of concrete work] as a labour
process—as ‘free, conscious activity’—from
‘work under the specific circumstances of
capitalism’, i.e. from the capitalist produc-
tion process, the process of valorization.” By
neglecting the valorization process, the activity
system as the “unit of analysis” would ulti-
mately reproduce “the ‘failure to comprehend
the labour process as an independent thing and
at the same time as an aspect of capitalist pro-
duction’ (Capital, Vol. 3: p. 1000),” because
it would “simply enumerate different aspects
of the capitalist production process, aspects
which are, of course, all present simultane-
ously […], but which need to be distinguished
as opposites" (Jones, 2003).
In sum, an error in Engeström’s theory does
not only consist in a lack of comprehending
the subjective and intersubjective plane of
human activity but also in a missed articula-
tion of societal contradictions. By referring to
the concept of an “inner contradiction” (cf. a
“double-bind” situation), Engeström tends to
psychologize the societal level of human prac-
tice. He tends to identify societal, social and
individual dimensions (like the motive and the
object of activity) instead of comprehending
the dialectical interrelation and distinction of
societal, social, and psychic processes. Thus,
the driving moment for development and
change would have to be rethought not only
on a subjective but on a societal plane, too.
The Contradictory Comprehension
of Human Activity and Development
in the CHAT Framework
A problematic and even contradictory use
of the concept of an activity system and its
triangular representation thus manifests itself
as Engeström tries to capture simultaneously 
the "germ cell" and the developed "totality" of 
any activity in general, second, as he seeks to 
explain the state of an inner contradiction as 
well as the process of practical development 
and change but fails to discern sufficiently the 
subjective and societal plane of practice, and
third, as he attempts to grasp the interrelations 
of a specific activity, but mainly enumerates 
isolated elements of it and locates them in 
a fixed system structure. Most problematic
about this conception of human activity is
that Engeström’s approach consequently loses
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the ability to analytically conceive the soci-
etal as well as the intra- and inter-individual
dimensions of practice dialectically: to grasp
it in its specific historical form in which it
emerges and in which it is reproduced and
transformed. Because the societal structures
and relations inherent to human practice are
products of historical development—that
means, of various actions undertaken by
heterogeneous subjects in different societal
contexts on a specific societal basis within a
certain constellation of power relations—it is
necessary to “investigate” and “explore” these
scientifically instead of locating them within
a predetermined and a-historical system
structure. Following Engeström’s theory, we
can either explain contradictions too gener-
ally as an all-contaminating tension between
use- and exchange-value, or identify them
with local disturbances or partial ruptures
that would demand for an “expansive learn-
ing” process only.11 But how could we find
new action possibilities to change practice
by means of his approach? We acknowledge
that the assembled components of an activity
can be helpful for excavating and describing
disturbances within institutionally established
routines. However, since the elimination of
the sources of friction or dysfunctions tends
to be Engeström’s main concern, a more
fundamental critique of the broader context
of societal relations is neglected. Given the
limits of his notion of activity and contra-
diction, the dialectics between the levels
of individual and societal development and
between the levels of particular and general
societal processes gets ultimately lost. The
process of learning as a process of societal
change—even if Engeström considers learn-
 11 Not surprisingly, some scholars who neglect the dia-
lectical notion of activity argue in relation to the tri-
angular model that contradictions could be designed 
into constructive learning environments (Jonassen &
Rohrer-Murphy, 1999)
ing in its collective form—becomes overes-
timated and overdrawn.
Since Engeström’s own reports and rep-
resentations of empirical studies articulate
both a limited idea of societal practice and
a problematic view on contradictions, we are
reminded of the challenges of critical research
to understand how societal contradictions are
“transverse” and cut “across” the plane of local
activities (which the triangular model repre-
sents), to investigate how they affect the forms
of human relationships, the forms of identities
or subjectivities, including the activities of our
own research. As we show in our exemplary
analyses, Engeström’s approach disregards
that contradictions tremendously mediate so-
cial relations and thereby narrow the scope for
development and empowerment. The societal
contradictions unfold their effects in a dialec-
tical way and therefore require a dialectical
analysis. But several aspects to guide such an
analysis are missing in Engeström’s theory.
Instead of merely encapsulating systemic
interrelations of practice, it would be important
to investigate how subjects, by their actions,
are confronted with certain societal structures
(like power relations). These structures may be
determining for individual actions, but since
they emerged historically through human ac-
tivity, they are always determined by individ-
ual actions as well. A critical theory therefore
needs to proceed dialectically: first by analyz-
ing how societal structures bring about certain
actions and how they impair others, how they
are internalized by subjects and embodied in
their behavior; and second, by excavating—on
a social and societal level—action possibili-
ties to intervene and to change those structures
that have become problematic for free human
development.
Social relationships—like forms of coop-
eration and modes of participation—come to
be reshaped and transformed in the dynamic
of struggling with those structures and their
underlying power relations that detach the sub-
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jects from taking influence and gaining power
to act (cf. Langemeyer, 2005b). Only if we
question and criticize our accumulated experi-
ence with such problems and conflicts and de-
velop our presently rudimentary knowledge of
societal interrelations and contradictions col-
lectively for intervention (“Zusammenhangs-
und Widerspruchswissen” [Holzkamp, 1988])
in form of a coherent conception of our world
(Gramsci, Prison notebook 11, §12, comment
1), do we open up opportunities for tackling
and resolving the fundamental contradictions
of our society. But we should not expect them
to be a “mechanism” of or even an “automa-
tism” for development. Rather we experience
that our engagements to change and enhance
practice are themselves quite contradictory. In
the most challenging entanglements, we there-
fore need to generate—each time anew—criti-
cal perspectives on these societal practices in
which we participate, and on our own social-
individual basis to act and to reflect on the
problems and conflicts to be resolved. This
is why dialectics play beyond its historical
influence on CHAT an important role in the
practical and theoretical struggles for eman-
cipation and why we should not abandon it to
reductionist, functionalist or systemic views.
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